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Fundamental to all human languages is an unlimited expressive capacity and creative
flexibility that allow speakers to rapidly generate novel and complex utterances. In
turn, listeners interpret language “on-line,” incrementally integrating multiple sources of
information as words unfold over time. A challenge for theories of language processing
has been to understand how speakers and listeners generate, gather, integrate, and
maintain representations in service of language processing. We propose that many of the
processes by which we use language place high demands on and receive contributions
from the hippocampal declarative memory system. The hippocampal declarative memory
system is long known to support relational binding and representational flexibility. Recent
findings demonstrate that these same functions are engaged during the real-time
processes that support behavior in-the-moment. Such findings point to the hippocampus
as a potentially key contributor to cognitive functions that require on-line integration of
multiple sources of information, such as on-line language processing. Evidence supporting
this view comes from findings that individuals with hippocampal amnesia show deficits
in the use of language flexibly and on-line. We conclude that the relational binding
and representational flexibility afforded by the hippocampal declarative memory system
positions the hippocampus as a key contributor to language use and processing.
Keywords: hippocampus, declarative memory, amnesia, language processing, discourse
The role of hippocampus (and related MTL structures) in the for-
mation and subsequent retrieval of new enduring (long-term)
memory is well-established (Cohen and Squire, 1980; Squire,
1992; Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993; Gabrieli, 1998). The hip-
pocampus also plays a central role in support of relational mem-
ory binding; the encoding of the co-occurrences of people, places,
and things along with their spatial, temporal, and interactional
relations into long-term memory representations (Cohen and
Eichenbaum, 1993; Ryan et al., 2000; Eichenbaum and Cohen,
2001; Davachi, 2006). Recent findings, however, challenge the
traditional view that the hippocampus contributes exclusively to
long-term memory by revealing declarative memory deficits in
patients with hippocampal amnesia following minimal delays and
when all necessary information is immediately available (e.g.,
Hannula et al., 2006; Barense et al., 2007; Warren et al., 2010).
These results converge with fMRI findings of hippocampal acti-
vation for relational learning over short delays (e.g., Ranganath
and D’Esposito, 2001; Hannula and Ranganath, 2008). These
findings suggest that new hippocampus-dependent declarative
memory representations are available early enough in process-
ing of a stimulus to influence behavioral performance “on-line,”
that is, rapidly enough to change the initial interpretation of
a stimulus event. The strong implication is that hippocampus-
dependent representations will be deployed and rapidly available
when any materials are processed in an ongoing fashion, and
that the performance of patients with hippocampal lesions and
declarative memory deficits will consequentially suffer. Indeed,
on-line maintenance and processing of simple (Warren et al.,
2010) and complex (Olson et al., 2006; Barense et al., 2007)
objects, scenes (Ryan et al., 2000; Hannula et al., 2006) and, as
we shall see, the on-line interpretation of a sentence, are impaired
in patients with hippocampal amnesia.
Language requires the rapid and incremental processing of
flexible and contextually defined form-meaning mappings. These
linguistic forms are formulated in rich, multi-modal contexts and
are interpreted with respect to multiple sources of information.
How this is accomplished in the brain, however, is the source of
unresolved theoretical debates and open questions surrounding
the underpinnings of language use and processing.
Attempts to link aspects of memory to particular proper-
ties of language are longstanding. Much of the work linking the
demands of language processing—and the theories that guide
it—has focused on “working memory” and/or “executive con-
trol processes,” functions putatively associated with prefrontal
cortex mechanisms. Certainly, the semantic memory system
provides critical support for language processing, in terms of
maintaining enduring representations of word meanings and
world knowledge. Additionally, a number of prominent theo-
ries specify a critical role in language use for episodic memory
(e.g., Clark and Marshall, 1978; Goldinger, 1998). However, the
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hippocampus-dependent declarative memory system as a whole
has received considerably less attention as a potential candidate
memory mechanism supporting on-line language processing,
that is, the incremental processing of language as it unfolds
in real-time. This is in part due to the long-held assumption
that the hippocampal declarative memory system contributes
only to long-term memory representations (not those that are
available quickly enough to guide on-line information process-
ing). Further, semantic knowledge (supporting lexical access)
becomes independent of the hippocampus over time via neocorti-
cal consolidation processes (Alvarez and Squire, 1994;McClelland
et al., 1995). As a result, the hippocampus-dependent declarative
memory system has not received serious consideration as a neu-
ral/cognitive system involved in language use and processing in
the moment.
Here we propose the hippocampus as a key contributor to
language use and processing. Our proposal draws on the rela-
tional binding and representational flexibility that are hallmark
characteristics of the hippocampal declarative memory system,
along with recent findings stretching the scope of hippocampus-
dependent processes to functions that operate in-the-moment
and on the narrowest of time-scales. In this review we delineate
an emerging view of the role of the functions of the hippocam-
pus and its implications for theories of language processing and
use. Specifically, we propose that many of the processes by which
we produce and understand language also place high demands
on and receive contributions from the hippocampal declarative
memory system. We will review the fundamental properties of
language with special attention to those aspects that would seem
to place particularly high demands on the hippocampal declar-
ative memory system. We present evidence from patients with
hippocampal amnesia who show deficits in the flexible and on-
line use of language. We will also point to aspects of language
use that appear independent of the hippocampal memory sys-
tem. Finally, we raise some open questions that follow from our
proposal.
FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTIES OF LANGUAGE
The fundamental properties of language include its arbitrariness,
its incrementality, its flexible and creative expression, and the fact
that it is multimodal. These properties place critical demands on
our ability to learn, process, and use language across the lifespan.
In this section, we review each of these properties.
LANGUAGE IS A SYSTEM OF ARBITRARY RELATIONS
Language conveys meaning using a set of largely arbitrary sym-
bols, arranged temporally (and spatially, in the case of signed
languages) following the patterns of the language. The relation-
ship between the phonological form of a word and its mean-
ing is largely arbitrary. That is, with some limited exceptions
(e.g., onomatopoeia and other limited word form and mean-
ing associations, Maurer et al., 2006), conceptual information
cannot be derived from the acoustic signal itself. The lack of
a direct correspondence of meaning and form is perhaps most
clearly exemplified by the cross-linguistic variation in the pho-
netic realization of symbols used to denote a given meaning.
For example the meaning associated with BIRD is denoted in
various languages as “oiseau” (French), “Vogel” (German), “zin-
tkala” (Lakota), and “burung” (Malay). Even within a language,
language understanding is complicated by what is known as the
many-to-many mapping problem: Across talkers and phonetic
contexts, a given acoustic signal can map onto different meanings
[e.g., in some American English dialects, the phoneme sequence
in/pIn/ maps onto both the meanings PIN and PEN (e.g., a vowel
merger)] (Peterson and Barney, 1952; Liberman et al., 1967).
Conversely, a given meaning can be expressed by different acous-
tic signals. The way in which symbols are arranged in a language
is also largely arbitrary. In English, adjectives generally precede
nouns (e.g., the small butterfly), whereas in Spanish they typ-
ically follow the noun (e.g., la mariposa pequeña). In English
and Spanish, the default word order is subject-verb-object (e.g.,
The girl caught the butterfly), whereas in Korean and Japanese
it is subject-object-verb. Using language critically involves learn-
ing and using these language- (or dialect-) specific relational
mappings.
LANGUAGE PROCESSING IS INCREMENTAL
Spoken language unfolds over time, at a rate of about 150–200
words per minute (Levelt, 1989; Tauroza and Allison, 1990). As
a result, many words and phrases are ambiguous, at least tem-
porarily, causing a proliferation of possible syntactic and semantic
interpretations as they accrue. Because the meaning of many
words is unclear until later in the sentence, language is processed
incrementally and multiple sources of information must be gen-
erated, integrated, andmaintained in real-time to create meaning.
Evidence from studies using on-line methods reveal that: (a)
words are integrated immediately into the on-going interpre-
tation of an utterance, with listeners making provisional com-
mitments to interpretations of lexical (Allopenna et al., 1998),
referential (Chambers et al., 2002; Hanna et al., 2003), and syn-
tactic ambiguities (Tanenhaus et al., 1995; Wilson and Garnsey,
2009) as the utterance unfolds; and (b) listeners make sophisti-
cated linguistic predictions about upcomingmaterial (Federmeier
and Kutas, 1999; DeLong et al., 2005; Federmeier, 2007), and
modulate those predictions based on integration of language with
concurrent scenes (Altmann and Kamide, 1999, 2007), past and
inferred scenes (Altmann and Kamide, 2009), and characteris-
tics of the sentential subject (Kamide et al., 2003) or talker (Van
Berkum et al., 2008, in press; Tesink et al., 2009). This work
points to rapid, bi-directional communication between multi-
ple levels of representation. In healthy adults, this would include
well-established (or enduring long-term) representations of syn-
tax, semantics, pragmatics and phonology, along with social and
contextual knowledge.
LANGUAGE USE IS FLEXIBLE AND CREATIVE
Fundamental to all human languages are a virtually unlimited
expressive capacity and a creative flexibility that allow speakers
to rapidly generate novel and complex utterances. All language
use involves, to a greater or lesser degree, some level of creativ-
ity and flexibility, as individuals rhetorically or poetically select
particular sounds and meanings in crafting their utterances and
selecting which details to represent for a specific listener on a par-
ticular occasion (e.g., Tannen, 1989; Norrick, 1998). Indeed, in
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using language speakers do not simply reproduce: they recreate,
repurpose, and recontextualize (Voloshinov, 1973; Bakhtin, 1986;
Prior, 2001; Maybin and Swann, 2007). Sociolinguistic research
points to the diverse functions that language flexibility and cre-
ativity serve across everyday settings as we reconstruct, reenact,
and retell the events and narratives of our lives (Tannen, 1989;
Ochs and Capps, 2001), and engage in playful verbal banter
(Crystal, 1998; Sherzer, 2002).
Particularly in dialog settings, language use involves the flex-
ible tailoring of language to the situation and dialog partner.
In a classic technique for studying dialog termed the Referential
Communication Task (Krauss and Weinheimer, 1964, 1966;
Fussell and Krauss, 1992), pairs of naive participants, separated
by a barrier, work together to complete a joint task. Participants
are each given a set of∼12 cards with distinct but potentially con-
fusable images (e.g., Figure 1), and one participant, the director,
instructs another participant, the matcher, to re-arrange her cards
into a different order over multiple rounds of play. Studies using
the Referential Communication Task have demonstrated that dia-
log partners jointly create shared names for the images, speeding
the accuracy and efficiency of game play across rounds (Clark and
Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). These names are not freely extended to new
partners or non-participatory partners (e.g., overhearers, Schober
and Clark, 1989; Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark, 1992; Brown-Schmidt,
2009a), suggesting that when the labels are interactively estab-
lished, dialog partners also encode information about who that
knowledge is shared with, i.e., information about their common
ground (Clark, 1992, 1996).
In addition to tailoring descriptions to individual partners,
dialog partners also show convergence in other aspects of lan-
guage use; these convergence effects are argued to be key evidence
for alignment theories of conversation (Pickering and Garrod,
FIGURE 1 | Set up and tangram figures for Referential Communication
Task.
2004), in which the adaptation of language to partner and context
is seen as key to its success. For example, listeners show perceptual
learning for vocal qualities of individual talkers that subsequently
affect both explicit judgments (Goldinger, 1998; Nygaard and
Pisoni, 1998; Evans and Iverson, 2003; Kraljic and Samuel, 2006,
2007; Maye et al., 2008), and implicit measures of on-line lan-
guage processing (Dahan et al., 2008; Trude and Brown-Schmidt,
2012). In conversation, dialog partners show a wide range of
imitative effects, including phonetic convergence (Pardo, 2006;
Bailly and Lelong, 2010), as well as convergence of gaze, facial
expression, posture, and foot-tapping (Kendon, 1970; Chartrand
and Bargh, 1999; Richardson and Dale, 2005; Richardson et al.,
2007). Social effects on phonetic convergence, including per-
ceived attractiveness and other-race biases (Babel, 2009), along
with evidence that mimicry increases rapport and facilitates com-
munication (LaFrance and Broadbent, 1976; LaFrance, 1979;
Chartrand and Bargh, 1999; Richardson and Dale, 2005) suggest
these processes are non-obligatory and that they may serve critical
social functions.
Convergence extends to higher-level language structures
including task-relevant descriptions and mental models of game
play (Garrod and Anderson, 1987; Schober, 1993; Brennan and
Clark, 1996), and syntactic form (Bock, 1986, 1989; also Levelt
and Kelter, 1982; Branigan et al., 2000; Gries, 2005; Haywood
et al., 2005; Reitter et al., 2006; Reitter and Moore, 2007). Such
convergence effects are modulated by the status of the con-
versational participants (stronger effects with addressees than
overhearers; Branigan et al., 2007), and are argued to be a criti-
cal component of successful communication (Clark andMarshall,
1981; Garrod and Doherty, 1994).
LANGUAGE USE IS MULTI-MODAL
Typical language use in face-to-face conversation has the spe-
cial property that the communication sources and receivers are
bodies situated in the physical world. The result of this primary
observation is that the domain of what is considered “language”
for the purposes of the conversation encompasses far more than
the stream of spoken words. Instead, the way the speaker’s body
moves as she speaks (e.g., gaze and gesture), and the way her
language and her body interface with the physical world (e.g.,
pointing at objects) become integral to the conversation—the
language—itself. Thus, understanding how language is used in
conversation requires appreciating how the spoken (or signed)
component of language is integrated with the world and with the
bodies that produce and comprehend that language.
The relevant context for language use, or referential domain
(Chambers et al., 2002; Landragin, 2006), is multiply determined.
For talk about the co-present visual world, the relevant referential
domain is based on an integration of information from the physi-
cal world, discourse history, and task goals. For example, consider
a scenario in which Annie and James are at a museum, and
Annie wishes to comment on one of Klein’s Blue Monochromes.
Displayed alone, she could refer to the painting as “this piece” or
even “it,” relying on the physical context to highlight the intended
referent over other salient but non-present referents (e.g., the
Mona Lisa). However, if multiple pieces were in view, to uniquely
identify the referent she would have to modify her expression
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with respect to the context, saying “the blue painting” or “the
monochrome one,” depending on the properties of other objects
in the context (Olson, 1970; Osgood, 1971). The physical context
not only constrains how we can refer to entities; it also changes
the interpretation process, allowing listeners to combine scene
information with the ongoing sentence to make predictions about
upcoming material (Altmann and Kamide, 1999) and to rule out
alternative interpretations of syntactic (Tanenhaus et al., 1995;
Spivey et al., 2002), and referential (Eberhard et al., 1995; Sedivy
et al., 1999) ambiguities.
Speaker gaze is another source of information that constrains
the referential domain. During conversation, speakers typically
gaze at the objects in a scene in the order in which they will name
them, at a latency of approximately −800 to −1000ms (Meyer
et al., 1998; Griffin and Bock, 2000; Meyer, 2004). As a result, the
addressee in face-to-face conversation can take advantage of the
gaze-speech link to facilitate comprehension processes. Speakers
also make facial and manual gestures, as well as other body move-
ments. These gestures can carry independent meaning as in the
case of iconic gestures (Holle and Gunter, 2007; also see Wagner
Cook and Tanenhaus, 2009), and can identify a referent or ref-
erential domain (see Landragin, 2006), as in the case of deixis or
pointing gestures (Clark and Krych, 2004). These findings suggest
that using language requires not only integrating across the words
in a sentence, but also integrating across multiple, rich sources
of information from different modalities, including information
about the visual world, gaze and gesture.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LANGUAGE ANDMEMORY
Although these fundamental properties of language are consid-
ered universal and are accomplished rapidly and with seem-
ingly little effort, how they are accomplished in the brain is
the source of unresolved theoretical debates and open questions
surrounding the underpinnings of language use and process-
ing. Attempts to link aspects of memory to particular prop-
erties of language are longstanding. In the language literature,
a dominant theme is the relationship between language pro-
cessing and working memory, specifically the hypothesis that
central functions including working memory and cognitive con-
trol are required to execute language processing (Daneman and
Carpenter, 1980, 1983; Just and Carpenter, 1992; Just et al.,
1996; Caplan and Waters, 1999; Walker, 1996; Novick et al.,
2005; although a prominent alternative view emphasizes the role
of experience, rather than capacity limits in capturing individ-
ual differences, MacDonald and Christiansen, 2002). Working
memory is an attractive candidate mechanism for meeting the
demands of incremental language processing due to its pur-
ported on-line maintenance capacity and the relative ease of
correlating performance on working memory and other execu-
tive function tasks with language processes in healthy subjects
(e.g., Nilsen and Graham, 2009; Brown-Schmidt, 2009b; Lin et al.,
2010; cf. Otten and Van Berkum, 2009). The attention to work-
ing memory is also likely related to the traditional view of the
hippocampal declarative memory system as making contribu-
tions only to long-term memory representations, and not to
those available rapidly enough to guide information processing in
the moment.
Another approach to the memory-language interface has been
to examine the relationship between types of language knowl-
edge and the types of memory that support them. Ullman (2004)
proposed the declarative/procedural model. On this model, the
mental lexicon of memorized arbitrary word-specific knowledge
depends on the medial temporal lobe substrates of declarative
memory. In contrast, the mental grammar depends on the net-
work of frontal, basal-ganglia, parietal and cerebellar structures
of procedural memory. The model has been used to account for
(among other things) dissociations in amnesia between impaired
lexical and spared grammatical learning. Indeed, an extensive
body of work in the memory literature demonstrates deficits
in vocabulary acquisition in patients with hippocampal dam-
age and declarative memory deficits (e.g., Gabrieli et al., 1988;
Bayley and Squire, 2002, 2005; Schmolck et al., 2002; Manns et al.,
2003; O’Kane et al., 2004; cf. Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997; Sharon
et al., 2011). Consistent with the declarative/procedural model,
these deficits are observed in the context of intact learning of
the patterns and statistical regularities of the grammar as mea-
sured by artificial grammar learning tasks (Knowlton et al., 1992;
Knowlton and Squire, 1994, 1996).
In the memory literature, the relationship between language
and declarative memory has largely been confined to word learn-
ing and interpreted in the context of semantic memory. This
likely has historical roots. The nature of observed impairment
in patients with hippocampal amnesia, such as H.M., has been
described as a deficit that is specific to the domain of memory
(leaving intellect and other cognitive abilities such as language
and attention intact) and within the domain of memory (affect-
ing only certain forms of memory). Following bilateral resection
of the medial temporal lobes, H.M. was considered to have nor-
mal language ability as he was not aphasic and performed within
normal limits on neuropsychological tests of language (Scoville
and Milner, 1957; Milner et al., 1968). Furthermore, H.M.’s pre-
morbid vocabulary and remote episodic memory were judged to
be largely intact suggesting that the hippocampus is not the stor-
age site for declarative memory. Rather, declarative memory can
become independent of the hippocampus over time via neocorti-
cal consolidation processes (Alvarez and Squire, 1994;McClelland
et al., 1995). These findings have encouraged a view of mem-
ory as a cognitive capacity distinct from the various cognitive
domains (language, spatial processing, etc.) that it serves. As a
result, the impairment in amnesia is seen as exclusive to a specific
aspect of memory functioning. While subsequent reports later
raised questions about H.M.’s language abilities, citing lexical,
phrasal, and sentence-level language disruptions (e.g., Lackner,
1974; Corkin, 1984; MacKay et al., 1998a,b), conclusively link-
ing these deficits to the functions of the hippocampus have
been difficult given HM’s extensive medial temporal lobe dam-
age extending beyond the hippocampus, his decades long history
of treatment for epilepsy, and his advancing age (see Schmolck
et al., 2000, 2002).
Acknowledging, of course, that not all aspects of language
are hippocampus-dependent, these conceptual and historical
factors have kept the hippocampal declarative memory system
from serious consideration as a neural/cognitive system involved
in language use and processing (for exceptions see Clark and
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Marshall, 1978; Goldinger, 1998). Our proposal stems from recent
discoveries regarding the surprising contribution of the hip-
pocampus to a variety of disparate functions and tasks, and over
a time scale typically considered within the domain of work-
ing memory. These findings challenge and expand the traditional
view of hippocampal function. We argue that these new find-
ings have significant implications for theories of language use
and processing, and should encourage increased interest in the
relationship between language and declarative memory.
HIPPOCAMPAL DECLARATIVE MEMORY: NEW DISCOVERIES
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR LANGUAGE USE
The hippocampus (and related MTL structures) plays a critical
role in the formation and retrieval of new enduring (long-term)
declarative memories and in the support of declarative memory
use (Cohen and Squire, 1980; Cohen, 1984; Squire, 1987, 1992;
Gabrieli, 1998; Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001). Two hallmark fea-
tures of the hippocampal declarative memory system include its
role in the creation and integration of relational representations
and the flexible expression of those representations. Relational rep-
resentations are created and supported through the binding of
the arbitrary co-occurrences of people, places, and things of a
scene or event. These binding operations link the spatial, tempo-
ral and interactional relations the components of an event, thus
establishing the larger record of one’s experience over time (e.g.,
a word and its meaning; an object and its location; Eichenbaum
and Cohen, 2001; Davachi, 2006; Konkel et al., 2008; Ranganath,
2010).
These relational (declarative) representations, which are sup-
ported by the hippocampus, are uniquely flexible, permitting
integration with other types of representations. Through the
interaction of the hippocampal system with various neocorti-
cal storage sites that are also involved in the initial encoding of
stimuli, these representations are accessible to other processing
systems (as when a rich autobiographical memory is evoked by
the sound of a familiar song), and are readily extended to use in
novel contexts (O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978; Cohen, 1984; Squire,
1992; Dusek and Eichenbaum, 1997; Eichenbaum and Cohen,
2001).
Recent evidence challenging the traditional view of the hip-
pocampal declarative memory system as contributing exclusively
to long-term memory has shown that patients with hippocam-
pal amnesia exhibit deficits in declarative memory even when
there are very short delays and no interposed delays at all, and
even when all the necessary information is in view (Hannula
et al., 2006; Olson et al., 2006; Barense et al., 2007; Warren et al.,
2010). These results converge with fMRI findings of hippocam-
pal activation for relational learning over similarly short delays
(e.g., Ranganath and D’Esposito, 2001; Hannula and Ranganath,
2008). These findings suggest that new hippocampus-dependent
representations are available rapidly enough to influence ongoing
processing when: new information is perceived; old information
is retrieved; and representations are held on-line to be evaluated,
manipulated, integrated, and used in service of behavioral per-
formance. Although the cited studies used visual or visuospatial
stimuli, the strong implication is that the hallmark flexibility and
integration of hippocampus-dependent representations will be
deployed and rapidly available when any materials are processed
in an ongoing fashion, and that the performance of patients
with hippocampal lesions and declarative memory deficits will
consequentially suffer.
These provocative findings regarding the time course of hip-
pocampal contributions to on-line processing have profound
implications for theories of language processing and use. We
have been conducting a line of work examining the contribution
of declarative memory to communication and language use in
patients with hippocampal damage and severe declarative mem-
ory deficits (Duff et al., 2006, 2007, 2008a,b, 2009, 2011; Kurczek
and Duff, 2011). This work has revealed deficits across vari-
ous aspects of linguistic and discourse functions suggesting that
patients with hippocampal amnesia have difficulty establishing,
recovering, maintaining and using declarative memory represen-
tations throughout a conversation particularly when the demands
on flexible and creative uses of language are high. We recently
extended this line of work to examine on-line language process-
ing (Rubin et al., 2011) and have initial, tantalizing evidence for
hippocampal mediation in real-time language processing.
Here we propose that many of the processes by which we pro-
duce and understand language place high demands on and receive
contributions from the hippocampal declarative memory system.
Established functions of hippocampal declarative memory sys-
tem include its relational binding and representational flexibility,
allowing the creation and flexible integration of different types
of representations. These functions support the formation and
maintenance of new memories, and new research from the visual
domain demonstrates the hippocampus is critically involved in
the on-line maintenance and processing of relational represen-
tations as well. At the heart of our proposal is that these same
features—on-line processing of rich representations from mul-
tiple domains—are key demands of the flexible use and on-line
processing of language.
THE HIPPOCAMPUS AND THE FLEXIBLE USE AND
PROCESSING OF LANGUAGE
HIPPOCAMPAL AMNESIA DISRUPTS THE FLEXIBLE AND
CREATIVE USE OF LANGUAGE
Language use—especially in the dialog contexts typical of every-
day use—is highly flexible. This points to the significance of
underlying cognitive mechanisms and neural substrates that are
adept at handling flexible relations. Consider the mappings of
words to meanings: While a given word may have a typical mean-
ing, words and phrases often have consistently different meanings
in different contexts, and for different people. Form-meaning
mappings change depending on variables including dialect (e.g.,
pop vs. soda), whether the addressee is a friend vs. a stranger
(e.g., my house vs. the green house, third from the left; Fussell and
Krauss, 1989), and the addressee’s knowledge and expertise (e.g.,
Rockefeller center vs. the square with the flags; Issacs and Clark,
1987; Horton and Keysar, 1996). These phenomena suggest that
language processing relies on flexible mappings between mean-
ings and words. In some cases word-meaning mappings reflect
enduring, long-term associations; in other cases these mappings
are generated during the course of a conversation. A number of
findings suggest that the flexibility important for conversational
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language use is provided by the hippocampal declarative memory
system.
In our first study in this line of work, we investigated the ability
of individuals with hippocampal amnesia to acquire and use refer-
ential labels for novel picture cards across repeated collaborative
interactions with a familiar partner using a modified version of
the Referential Communication Task described above (Duff et al.,
2006). In the study, amnesic patients sat across from a familiar
partner (friend, spouse) and they each had a board with 12 num-
bered spaces and a set of 12 cards displaying Chinese tangrams
(e.g., Figure 1). A low barrier was placed on the table between
them preventing a view of each others’ cards but allowing them to
see each other’s facial expressions and gestures. The amnesics were
always the director and communicated to their familiar partners
(always the matcher) how to complete their board with the cards
so that at the end of the trial the two boards looked alike. The
task was presented as a game and participant pairs were instructed
to communicate freely and to have fun. The pairs played the
game 24 times over 2 days (six trials per session, two sessions per
day). We found that despite severe declarative memory impair-
ments, amnesic participants developed and used unique labels for
the cards. Across trials these labels became increasingly concise
and simplified. In fact, the rate of learning exhibited by amnesic
participants, measured by the reduction in time and words nec-
essary to complete each trial, did not differ from that of healthy
participants.
These findings were important in a number of regards. First,
in contrast to other studies of word learning or semantic memory
(e.g., Gabrieli et al., 1988), the learning exhibited by the amnesic
participants in our collaborative referencing task involved a nor-
mal rate of acquisition. (It is important to note that the amnesic
patients were not required to learn arbitrarily related labels, but
rather drew on preexisting semantic representations, such as
“siesta man” for a figure that could be seen as a man resting or
reclining.) Second, these findings suggested that amnesic patients
could acquire and use common ground in their communicative
interactions. This challenged views of the memory determinants
of common ground and suggested that common ground may
have multiple forms and determinants, dependent upon the con-
tributions of different memory systems in the brain (Duff et al.,
2006). Third, these findings suggest that these interactive sessions
offer a potent means of observing the complex interaction of
memory and language and of testing the unique contribution of
distinct memory systems tomeeting the demands of language use.
Our modified Referential Communication Task was demanding,
particularly of the amnesic patients, and the interactive sessions
provided an exceptionally rich corpus of data on language use
across extended and repeated interactions and on the partic-
ular communication practices and resources of conversational
language in amnesia (see Duff et al., 2008b).
While these findings demonstrated surprising sparing of new
learning in amnesia, subsequent analyses showed that despite pre-
served learning, language usewas not entirely normal: In a follow-
up analysis of the referential forms used to describe the picture
cards, we examined the use of definite reference (e.g., the wind-
mill vs. a windmill) (Duff et al., 2011). Definite reference signals
to the listener that the speaker believes the referent is uniquely
identifiable in the joint representation of the local context, or
common ground (Clark and Marshall, 1978). Comparison par-
ticipants marked the referential forms with a definite reference
(e.g., the windmill) 90% of the time whereas amnesic patients
were at near chance levels (56%) using indefinite articles (e.g., a
windmill) nearly as often (Duff et al., 2011). That is, even though
the amnesic patients had described the tangrams multiple times
and were using concise labels, even after 24 trials the patients
were still using an indefinite reference, as if they were encoun-
tering the tangrams and generating the labels for the very first
time. These findings highlight the role of declarative memory in
flexibly tailoring utterances for specific communication partners
to reflect joint knowledge. These findings also point to the role
of declarative memory in language beyond semantic memory or
word learning by linking a deficit in declarative memory to dis-
ruptions in referential processes (e.g., marking noun phrases as
definite or indefinite; also see Kurczek and Duff, 2011 for further
evidence of deficits in referential processing).
In subsequent analyses aimed at characterizing discourse pro-
cesses in amnesia, we found that, while the semantic content
of the references were similar across amnesia and comparison
participants (siesta man vs. lazy man) the patients exhibited a
general lack of flexibility in their referential expressions (Duff
et al., 2008b). As the task progressed, comparison participants
rapidly omitted all non-essential words for identifying target
cards, including verbs (e.g., leaning against a tree is one→ leaning
against a tree eleven), articles (e.g., the bird→ bird), and place
numbers (e.g., four is the kicker → the kicker). Some comparisons
even began to dropmorphological endings to further shorten one
word labels (e.g., kicking → kick). Amnesic patients, in contrast,
did not shorten their utterances in these ways, making the average
length of their referential expressions twice as long as compari-
son participants. The social discourse of the patients also differed
from comparison participants in the lack of personal and com-
munal knowledge (e.g., comparisons referenced Elaine dancing,
Kramer, and Jerry’s cereal from the show Seinfeld) and in acknowl-
edging and using multiple perspectives (e.g., comparisons distin-
guished perspectives, as in: Number two is to me an Indian, to you
the stock market). Yet, amnesic patients still showed intact learning
in the task. This suggests that some aspects of common ground
are hippocampus-independent, and thus preserved in amnesia,
whereas other aspects of common ground are hippocampus-
dependent. The patients’ lack of discursive flexibility in language
production and the striking absence of high-level discourse fea-
tures such as acknowledging and using the perspectives of others,
and explicitly drawing upon personal and communal knowledge
suggest that hippocampus-dependent common ground functions
include the flexible use of enduring representations in utterance
formulation (Duff et al., 2008b, 2011).
Studies of creative language use also point to critical contri-
butions from the hippocampus-dependent declarative memory.
Creativity requires the rapid combination and recombination of
existing mental representations to create novel ideas and ways of
thinking (Damasio, 2001; Bristol and Viskontas, 2006). Examples
of creative language use include everyday discourse practices such
as reported speech, in which speakers represent or reenact words
or thoughts from other times and/or places (e.g., If I ever have
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kids I’m going to tell them, please don’t say mean things to me;
Tannen, 1989; McCarthy, 1998). Similarly, verbal play involves
playing with the sounds and meanings of words through the use
of puns, voices and sound effects, teasing, and telling funny stories
(Crystal, 1998; Sherzer, 2002). According to our proposal, the hip-
pocampal declarative memory system supports these processes
through the creation, updating, and juxtaposition of mental rep-
resentations and for their flexible and novel use in dialog contexts.
We have found deficits in the use of both of these discourse
practices in patients with hippocampal amnesia.
In our study on reported speech, we found that although there
were no group differences in the amount of talk, in the conversa-
tional sessions of patients with hippocampal amnesia interacting
with a clinician there were only half as many reported speech
episodes (RSEs) (M = 30.3; SD = 16.9) as there were in sessions
with healthy comparisons (M = 61.5; SD = 30.1), a difference
that was statistically significant (Duff et al., 2007). As might be
expected from patients with anterograde amnesia, the RSEs that
referred to recent events (i.e., post-amnesia-onset events) were
more schematic and less detailed than those produced by healthy
participants. However, this restricted use of reported speech was
not limited to reports about the recent time period. Rather, even
when producing vivid remote memories, individuals with amne-
sia are less likely to use reported speech when representing these
memories in communicative interactions. We speculated that
this was because, although the static display of remote mem-
ories becomes independent of the hippocampus over time, the
hippocampus plays a critical role in the flexible expression of
declarative memory representations in novel situations (Cohen
and Eichenbaum, 1993; Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001; see Duff
et al., 2007). Reported speech requires flexible access to our record
of events as well as the ability to flexibly and creatively gener-
ate unique combinations of the reconstructed elements (what
details to represent, what details to omit, to meet the specific
interactional goals of this telling, on this occasion, with this com-
munication partner). Reported speech also requires maintaining,
relating, and flexibly moving back and forth (mentally) between
different time frames. As a result, it places significant demands on
the flexible and creative processing capabilities of the hippocam-
pal declarative memory system and thus we observe striking
deficits in patients with hippocampal amnesia. In terms of cogni-
tive and neural specificity, it is interesting to note that damage to
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), shown repeatedly to
be involved in social and emotional processing and future think-
ing, does not impair these aspects of reported speech use (Duff
et al., 2009).
Similarly, in a study on verbal play in amnesia, we found
that amnesia patients produced significantly fewer verbal play
episodes (N = 187; M = 46.7) than comparison participants
(N = 395; M = 98.7). The quality of the amnesics’ verbal play
episodes also differed. In contrast to comparison participants,
verbal play episodes produced by the patients were more rotely
and repetitively produced (as when an amnesia patient repro-
duced the same joke, nearly verbatim, multiple times). For
amnesic participants, verbal play was also less skillfully deployed
(i.e., few productions combining verbal, prosodic, and gestural
resources), and playful themes were not sustained across stretches
of interaction or returned to in subsequent interactions. These
findings suggest that hippocampal amnesia impairs the ability to
creatively and flexibility deploy the communicative and cognitive
resources necessary to meet the moment-to-moment demands of
interactional discourse. This is consistent with deficits in creative
thinking more generally in amnesia (Duff et al., 2009). Again, in
terms of specificity, damage to the vmPFC does not impair these
aspects of verbal play (Gupta et al., 2012).
HIPPOCAMPAL AMNESIA IMPAIRS THE INCREMENTAL
PROCESSING OF LANGUAGE
Separate from the question of the accuracy of language use
and understanding is the question of the time-course of lan-
guage understanding. As stated above, we propose that the same
processes by which the hippocampus creates and integrates rep-
resentations in the formation of new memories, and maintains
representations on-line to be evaluated and used in service of
behavioral performance, are the same processes necessary for the
on-line processing of language. The deficits in language produc-
tion described above point to difficulty in establishing, recover-
ing, maintaining and using representations across the course of a
conversation. An open question is whether language comprehen-
sionmight also be compromised by hippocampal damage, even in
cases where memory demands are minimal. In on-going research,
we are finding striking new evidence that hippocampal damage
does, in fact, confer deficits in on-line language processing.
As we have discussed, a critical component to language use
is circumscribing the relevant domain of interpretation. One
key way in which dialog partners constrain the relevant domain
is through attention to what information is mutually known
between conversational partners, i.e., common ground (Clark,
1992). In healthy individuals, common ground is used rapidly
to rule out potential linguistic competitors, allowing the listener
to identify what the speaker is referring to (Hanna et al., 2003;
Heller et al., 2008; Brown-Schmidt et al., 2008). Interestingly,
despite being central to language, little is known about how
this information is represented in memory. In a recent study
(Rubin et al., 2011), we assessed the role of declarative mem-
ory in the use of common ground during on-line referential
ambiguity resolution. Rubin and colleagues created situations in
which a linguistic ambiguity was eliminated if common ground
information was taken into account: participants saw a com-
puter display with two different ducks, whereas the experimenter
saw a display with only one duck. Replicating previous find-
ings (Hanna et al., 2003), we found that both amnesics and
healthy comparisons reliably looked to the jointly visible duck
when the experimenter said Look at the duck. However, even
when they successfully fixated the target, amnesia patients were
more likely to look at the competitor object than comparison
participants. This result suggests that while the ultimate inter-
pretation of language was comparable between amnesics and
healthy comparisons, the on-line process was not. A condition in
which common ground was established linguistically (see Hanna
et al., 2003; Brown-Schmidt, 2012) replicated these findings; how-
ever, amnesic patients’ performance dropped to chance when a
brief minimal, filled delay followed establishment of linguistic
common ground.
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These findings reveal novel deficits in hippocampal amnesia
in using recent experience to guide on-line language processing.
Minimal delays were sufficient to eliminate the influence of lin-
guistic history, leaving the patients unable to resolve a simple
linguistic ambiguity. Moreover, competitor objects had a more
powerful pull on the fixations of amnesia patients than com-
parison participants, even in the absence of explicit memory
demands, raising interesting questions about the distinctiveness
of the representations formed by the patients and their abil-
ity to use immediately available information to resolve linguistic
competition. These results provide key initial evidence for the
significance of the hippocampal declarative memory system in
on-line language processing. An open question is whether the
observed deficits in competition resolution are present at all levels
of the language processing system.
LANGUAGE AND THE MULTIPLE MEMORY SYSTEMS
OF THE BRAIN
We have argued that many of the processes by which we produce
and understand language place demands on and receive contri-
butions from the hippocampal declarative memory system. Indeed,
aspects of language use are impaired in patients with hippocam-
pal amnesia when the task demands acquisition of arbitrary
relations (e.g., word-meaning mappings), incremental process-
ing, or the flexible and creative use of language. Other aspects
of language use appear independent of hippocampal declarative
memory. For example, learning of patterns and statistical regu-
larities of the grammar (e.g., Knowlton and Squire, 1996) and
syntactic priming (Ferreira et al., 2008) are intact in patients
with hippocampal amnesia. Furthermore, much of the work on
convergence, mimicry, and adaptation in communication and
social interaction, thought to be critical for conversational suc-
cess, suggest non-declarative mechanisms (e.g., Chartrand and
Bargh, 1999; Pickering and Garrod, 2004). A rich and dynamic
view of the language processing system that includes all its prop-
erties (i.e., its arbitrariness, its multimodality, its incrementality,
and its flexible and creative expression) opens up a plethora of
questions about which memory systems are called upon in service
of meeting the demands of language use.
A compelling approach to addressing these questions is to
examine language at the intersection of declarative and non-
declarative memory systems and to view the activities of language
(e.g., word learning; developing and using common ground) as
necessitating a division of labor between the memory systems (see
Davis and Gaskell, 2009; Gupta and Tisdale, 2009; Duff et al.,
2011). For example, integrated within a Complementary Learning
Systems framework (e.g., McClelland et al., 1995), Gupta and
colleagues argue that word learning requires contributions from
both memory systems: Whereas learning the phonological form
of a word depends on non-declarative memory mechanisms,
learning the semantic representation of a word depends on declar-
ative memory (Gupta, 2011). This view is in contrast to Ullman’s
(2004) proposal, which posits that declarative and procedural
memory underlie in the lexicon and the grammar, respectively.
The approach taken by Gupta and colleagues is also consis-
tent with our work on the memory determinants of common
ground. We have suggested that common ground has multiple
forms and determinants dependent on the contribution of dif-
ferent memory systems in the brain with procedural memory
supporting the gradual learning seen when amnesic patients learn
concise referential labels, and declarative memory supporting the
ability to linguistically mark those labels as part of shared knowl-
edge (impaired in amnesic patients; Duff et al., 2006, 2008a,b,
2011).
CONCLUSION
The language processing system is a rich and dynamic set of
processes that reach far beyond the arrangement of abstract
linguistic symbols according to grammatical rules. Instead, lan-
guage processing involves the rapid and incremental processing
of flexible, creative, and contextually defined form-meaningmap-
pings. These linguistic forms are produced and interpreted with
respect to rich and jointly defined multi-modal contexts and
are integrated with information from multiple domains includ-
ing gesture, entities in the physical world, and partner-specific
representations of voice quality and jointly established meaning.
Here we challenge a longstanding view of the hippocampus as
narrowly serving memory functions, and as such, making lim-
ited contributions to the use and processing of language. In doing
so, we reach beyond findings of some language deficits in patient
HM (e.g., MacKay et al., 1998a,b) in arguing that understanding
the role of the hippocampus in language processing will require
examining language use in real-time and in rich, multi-modal
contexts. Recent findings pointing to deficits in real-time process-
ing and in the absence of delays stretch the scope of hippocampus-
dependent processes to functions that operate in-the-moment
and on the narrowest of time-scales. Given these findings, along
with other evidence that the hippocampus is critically involved in
the binding of arbitrary relations across modalities and domains,
the hippocampus emerges as a potentially key contributor to the
real-time use and processing of language.
Against this backdrop of theoretical proposals and findings,
we propose a new view of the role of the hippocampus in lan-
guage processing in which the hippocampus is integrally involved
in the retrieval and binding of information across domains that is
critical for on-line language processing. New evidence supporting
this view comes from findings that individuals with hippocampal
amnesia show deficits in language use (Duff et al., 2007, 2008a,b,
2009, 2011; Kurczek and Duff, 2011) and on-line processing
(Rubin et al., 2011). Open questions include whether the flexible
and novel use of remote episodic memory, the processing of estab-
lished semantic memory (e.g., arbitrary word-meaning relations),
and the integration of multi-modal information during on-line
language processing, such as gesture and object representations,
are impaired in amnesia as well.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Research presented in this article was supported by NIDCD F32
DC008825, NINDS NS19632, NIMH RO1 MH062500, and a
Mary Jane Neer Research Grant of the College of Applied Health
Sciences at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Manuscript preparation supported by NIDCD R01 DC011755.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 69 | 8
Duff and Brown-Schmidt Hippocampus and language
REFERENCES
Allopenna, P. D., Magnuson, J. S., and
Tanenhaus, M. K. (1998). Tracking
the time course of spoken word
recognition: evidence for continu-
ous mapping models. J. Mem. Lang.
38, 419–439.
Altmann, G. T. M., and Kamide, Y.
(1999). Incremental interpretation
at verbs: restricting the domain of
subsequent reference. Cognition 73,
247–264.
Altmann, G. T. M., and Kamide, Y.
(2007). The real-time mediation of
visual attention by language and
world knowledge: linking anticipa-
tory (and other) eye movements to
linguistic processing. J. Mem. Lang.
57, 502–518.
Altmann, G. T. M., and Kamide, Y.
(2009). Discourse-mediation of the
mapping between language and the
visual world: eye movements and
mental representation. Cognition
111, 55–71.
Alvarez, P., and Squire, L. R. (1994).
Memory consolidation and the
medial temporal lobe: a simple
network model. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U.S.A. 91, 7041–7045
Babel, M. E. (2009). Phonetic and
Social Selectivity in Speech Accom-
modation. Unpublished doctoral
dissertation, UC Berkeley, CA.
Bailly, G., and Lelong, A. (2010).
Speech Dominoes and Phonetic
Convergence. Presented at
Interspeech. Tokyo, Japan.
Bakhtin, M. (1986). Speech Genres and
Other Late Essays. Austin: University
of Texas Press.
Barense, M. D., Gaffan, D., and
Graham, K. S. (2007). The human
medial temporal lobe processes
online representations of com-
plex objects. Neuropsychologia 45,
2963–297.
Bayley, P., and Squire, L. (2002). Medial
temporal lobe amnesia: gradual
acquisition of factual information
by nondeclarative memory. J.
Neurosci. 22, 5741–5748.
Bayley, P., and Squire, L. (2005). Failure
to acquire new semantic knowledge
in patients with large medial tem-
poral lobe lesions. Hippocampus 15,
273–280.
Bock, J. K. (1986). Syntactic persis-
tence in language production. Cogn.
Psychol. 18, 355–387.
Bock, K. (1989). Closed-class imma-
nence in sentence production.
Cognition 31, 163–186.
Branigan, H. P., Pickering, M. J., and
Cleland, A. A. (2000). Syntactic
coordination in dialogue. Cognition
75, B13–B25.
Branigan, H. P., Pickering, M. J.,
McLean, J. F., and Cleland, A. A.
(2007). Participant role and syntac-
tic alignment in dialogue. Cognition
104, 163–197.
Brennan, S. E., and Clark, H. H.
(1996). Conceptual pacts and lex-
ical choice in conversation. J. Exp.
Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 22,
1482–1493.
Bristol, A., and Viskontas, I. (2006).
“Dynamic processes within
associative memory stores,” in
Creativity and Reason in Cognitive
Development, eds J. Kaufman and
J. Baer (New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press) 60–80.
Brown-Schmidt, S. (2009a). Par-
tner-specific interpretation of
maintained referential precedents
during interactive dialog. J. Mem.
Lang. 61, 171–190.
Brown-Schmidt, S. (2009b). The role of
executive function in perspective-
taking during on-line language
comprehension. Psychon. Bull. Rev.
16, 893–900.
Brown-Schmidt, S. (2012). Beyond
common and privileged: gradient
representations of common ground
in real-time language use. Lang.
Cogn. Process. 27, 62–89.
Brown-Schmidt, S., Gunlogson, C.,
and Tanenhaus, M. K. (2008).
Addressees distinguish shared
from private information when
interpreting questions during inter-
active conversation. Cognition 107,
1122–1134.
Caplan, D., and Waters, G. (1999).
Verbal working memory and sen-
tence comprehension. Behav. Brain
Sci. 22, 77–94.
Chambers, C. G., Tanenhaus, M.
K., Eberhard, K. M., Filip,
H., and Carlson, G. N. (2002).
Circumscribing referential domains
during real-time sentence com-
prehension. J. Mem. Lang. 47,
30–49.
Chartrand, T. L., and Bargh, J. A.
(1999). The chameleon effect: the
perception-behavior link and social
interaction. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 76,
893–910.
Clark, H. H. (1992). Arenas of Language
Use. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Clark, H. H. (1996). Using Language.
Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Clark, H. H., and Krych, M. A.
(2004). Speaking while monitor-
ing addressees for understanding. J.
Mem. Lang. 50, 62–81.
Clark, H. H., and Marshall, C. R.
(1978). “Reference diaries,” in
Theoretical Issues in Natural
Language Processing, Vol. 2, ed D. L.
Waltz (New York, NY: Association
for Computing Machinery), 57–63.
Clark, H. H., and Marshall, C. R.
(1981). “Definite reference and
mutual knowledge,” in Elements
of Discourse Understanding, eds A.
K. Joshi, B. L.Webber, and I. A.
Sag, (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge
University Press), 10–63.
Clark, H. H., and Wilkes-Gibbs, D.
(1986). Referring as a collab-
orative process. Cognition 22,
1–39.
Cohen, N. J. (1984). “Preserved learn-
ing capacity in amnesia: evidence
for multiple memory systems,” in
The Neuropsychology of Memory,
eds N. Butters and L. Squire
(New York, NY: Guilford Press),
83–103.
Cohen, N. J., and Eichenbaum, H.
(1993). Memory, Amnesia and the
Hippocampal System. Cambridge,
MA.: MIT Press.
Cohen, N. J., and Squire, L. R. (1980).
Preserved learning and retention of
a pattern-analyzing skill in amne-
sia: dissociation of knowing how
and knowing that. Science 210,
207–210.
Corkin, S. (1984). Lasting con-
sequences of bilateral medial
temporal lobectomy: clinical course
and experimental findings in H.M.
Semin. Neurol. 4, 249–259.
Crystal, D. (1998). Language Play.
Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Dahan, D., Drucker, S. J., and
Scarborough, R. A. (2008). Talker
adaptation in speech percep-
tion: adjusting the signal or the
representations? Cognition 108,
710–718.
Damasio, A. R. (2001). “Some notes
on brain, imagination, and creativ-
ity,” in The Origins of Creativity, eds
K. H. Pfenninger and V. R. Shubik
(Oxford: Oxford University Press),
59–68.
Daneman, M., and Carpenter, P. A.
(1980). Individual differences in
working memory and reading.
J. Verb. Learn. Verb. Behav. 19,
450–466.
Daneman, M., and Carpenter, P. A.
(1983). Individual differences in
integrating information between
and within sentences. J. Exp.
Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 9,
561–584.
Davachi, L. (2006). Item, context,
and relational episodic encoding in
humans. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 16,
693–700
Davis, M. H., and Gaskell, M. G.
(2009). A complementary systems
account of word learning: neural
and behavioural evidence. Philos.
Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 364,
3773–3800.
DeLong, K. A., Urbach, T. P., and Kutas,
M. (2005). Probabilistic word pre-
activation during language com-
prehension inferred from electri-
cal brain activity. Nat. Neurosci. 8,
1117–1121.
Duff, M. C., Ballard, K., Bachelder,
B., and Tranel, D. (2009).
Reported Speech in Patients with
Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex
Damage. Poster presentation at
the American Speech-Language-
Hearing Association (ASHA), New
Orleans, LA.
Duff, M. C., Gupta, R., Hengst, J.,
Tranel, D., and Cohen, N. J. (2011).
The use of definite references signals
declarative memory: evidence from
hippocampal amnesia. Psychol. Sci.
22, 666–673.
Duff, M. C., Hengst, J., Tengshe, C.,
Krema, A., Tranel, D., and Cohen,
N. J. (2008a). Hippocampal amnesia
disrupts the flexible use of proce-
dural discourse in social interaction.
Aphasiology 22, 1–15.
Duff, M. C., Hengst, J., Tranel,
D., and Cohen, N. J. (2006).
Development of shared information
in communication despite hip-
pocampal amnesia. Nat. Neurosci. 9,
140–146.
Duff, M. C., Hengst, J., Tranel, D., and
Cohen, N. J. (2007). Talking across
time: using reported speech as a
communicative resource in amne-
sia. Aphasiology 21, 1–14.
Duff, M. C., Hengst, J., Tranel, D., and
Cohen, N. J. (2008b). Collaborative
discourse facilitates efficient com-
munication and new learning in
amnesia. Brain Lang. 106, 41–54.
Duff, M. C., Hengst, J., Tranel, D., and
Cohen, N. J. (2009). Hippocampal
amnesia disrupts verbal play and
the creative use of language in
social interaction. Aphasiology 23,
926–939.
Duff, M. C., Rubin, R., Bachelder, B.,
Cohen, N. J., and Tranel, D. (2009).
Hippocampal Amnesia Impairs
Creative Thinking. Poster presenta-
tion at the Society for Neuroscience
Conference, Chicago, IL.
Dusek, J., and Eichenbaum, H. (1997).
The hippocampus and memory for
orderly stimulusrelations.Proc.Natl.
Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 13, 7109–7114.
Eberhard, K. M., Spivey-Knowlton, M.
J., Sedivy, J. C., and Tanenhaus,
M. K. (1995). Eye-movements as
a window into spoken language
comprehension in natural contexts.
J. Psycholinguist. Res. 24, 409–436.
Eichenbaum, H., and Cohen, N.
J. (2001). From Conditioning to
Conscious Recollection: Memory
Systems of the Brain. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 69 | 9
Duff and Brown-Schmidt Hippocampus and language
Evans, B. G., Iverson, P. (2003).
“Vowel normalization for accent: a
comparison of northern and south-
ern British English speakers,” in
Proceedings of the 15th International
Conference of Phonetic Sciences.
Barcelona.
Federmeier, K. D. (2007). Thinking
ahead: the role and roots of pre-
diction in language comprehension.
Psychophysiology 44, 491–505.
Federmeier, K. D., and Kutas, M.
(1999). A rose by any other name:
long-term memory structure and
sentence processing. J. Mem. Lang.
41, 469–495.
Ferreira, V. S., Bock, K., Wilson, M.,
and Cohen, N. J. (2008). Memory
for syntax despite amnesia. Psychol.
Sci. 19, 940–946.
Fussell, S. R., and Krauss, R. M.
(1989). Understanding friends and
strangers: the effects of audience
design on message comprehen-
sion. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 19,
509–525.
Fussell, S. R., and Krauss, R. M.
(1992). Coordination of knowledge
in communication: effects of speak-
ers’ assumptions about what oth-
ers know. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 62,
378–391.
Gabrieli, J. D. E. (1998). Cognitive neu-
roscience of human memory. Annu.
Rev. Psychol. 49, 87–115.
Gabrieli, J. D., Cohen, N. J., and Corkin,
S. (1988). The impaired learning of
semantic knowledge following bilat-
eral medial temporal-lobe resection.
Special issue: single-case studies in
amnesia: theoretical advances. Brain
Cogn. 7, 157–177.
Garrod, S., and Anderson, A. (1987).
Saying what you mean in dia-
logue: a study in conceptual and
semantic co-ordination. Cognition
27, 181–218.
Garrod, S., and Doherty, G. (1994).
Conversation, co-ordination and
convention: an empirical inves-
tigation of how groups establish
linguistic conventions. Cognition
53, 181–215.
Goldinger, S. D. (1998).Echoes of
echoes? An episodic theory of
lexical access. Psychol. Rev. 105,
251–279.
Gries, S. (2005). Syntactic prim-
ing: a corpus-based approach. J.
Psycholinguist. Res. 34, 365–399.
Griffin, Z. M., and Bock, J. K. (2000).
What the eyes say about speaking.
Psychol. Sci. 11, 274–279.
Gupta, P. (2011). “Word learning
as the confluence of memory
mechanisms: Computational and
neural evidence,” in The Handbook
of the Neuropsychology of Language,
ed M. Faust (UK: Wiley-Blackwell).
Gupta, P., and Tisdale, J. (2009). Word
learning, phonological short-term
memory, phonotactic probability
and long-term memory: towards an
integrated framework. Philos. Trans.
R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Soc. 364,
3755–3771.
Gupta, R., Tranel, D., and Duff, M.
C. (2012). Ventromedial prefrontal
cortex damage does not impair
the development and use of com-
mon ground in social interaction:
implications for cognitive theory
of mind. Neuropsychologia 50,
145–152.
Hanna, J. E., Tanenhaus, M. K., and
Trueswell, J. C. (2003). The effects
of common ground and perspec-
tive on domains of referential
interpretation. J. Mem. Lang. 49,
43–61.
Hannula, D., and Ranganath, C. (2008).
Medial temporal lobe activity pre-
dicts successful relational memory
binding. J. Neurosci. 28, 116–124.
Hannula, D., Tranel, D., and Cohen, N.
J. (2006). The long and the short of
it: relational memory impairments
in amnesia, even at short lags. J.
Neurosci. 26, 8352–8259.
Haywood, S., Pickering, M. J., and
Branigan, H. P. (2005). Do speak-
ers avoid ambiguity in dialogue?
Psychol. Sci. 16, 362–366.
Heller, D., Grodner, D., and Tanenhaus,
M. K. (2008). The role of perspec-
tive in identifying domains of refer-
ence. Cognition 108, 831–836.
Holle, H., and Gunter, T. C. (2007). The
role of iconic gestures in speech dis-
ambiguation: ERP evidence. J. Cogn.
Neurosci. 19, 1175–1192.
Horton, W. S., and Keysar, B. (1996).
When do speakers take into account
common ground? Cognition 59,
91–117.
Issacs, E. A., and Clark, H. H. (1987).
References in conversation between
experts and novices. J. Exp. Psychol.
Gen. 116, 26–37.
Just, M. A., and Carpenter, P. A.
(1992). A capacity theory of com-
prehension: individual differences
in working memory. Psychol. Rev.
99, 122–149.
Just, M. A., Carpenter, P. A., and Keller,
T. A. (1996). The capacity theory
of comprehension: new frontiers of
evidence and arguments. Psychol.
Rev. 103, 773–780.
Kamide, Y., Altmann, G. T. M., and
Haywood, S. L. (2003). The time-
course of prediction in incremen-
tal sentence processing: evidence
from anticipatory eye movements. J.
Mem. Lang. 49, 133–159.
Kendon, A. (1970). Movement coordi-
nation in social interactions. Acta
Psychol. (Amst.) 32, 101–125.
Knowlton, B., Ramus, S., and Squire,
L. (1992). Intact artificial gram-
mar learning in amnesia: disso-
ciation of classification learning
and explicit memory for specific
instances. Psychol. Sci. 3, 172–179.
Knowlton, B. J., and Squire, L. R.
(1994). The information acquired
during artificial grammar learning.
J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn.
20, 79–91.
Knowlton, B. J., and Squire, L. R.
(1996). Artificial grammar learning
depends on implicit acquisition
of both rule-based and exemplar-
specific information. J. Exp.
Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 22,
169–181.
Konkel, A., Warren, D. E., Duff, M. C.,
Tranel, D., and Cohen, N. J. (2008).
Hippocampal amnesia impairs
all manner of relational memory.
Front. Hum. Neurosci. 2:15. Doi:
10.3389/neuro.09.015.2008
Kraljic, T., and Samuel, A. G. (2006).
Generalization in perceptual learn-
ing for speech. Psychon. Bull. Rev.
13, 262–268.
Kraljic, T., and Samuel, A. G. (2007).
Perceptual adjustments to multiple
speakers. J. Mem. Lang. 56, 1–15.
Krauss, R. M., and Weinheimer,
S. (1964). Changes in reference
phrases as a function of frequency
of usage in social interactions.
Psychon. Sci. 1, 113–114.
Krauss, R. M., and Weinheimer, S.
(1966). Concurrent feedback, con-
firmation, and the encoding of ref-
erents in verbal communication.
J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 4, 343–346.
Kurczek, J., and Duff, M. C. (2011).
Cohesion, coherence, and declara-
tive memory: discourse patterns of
patients with hippocampal amnesia.
Aphasiology 25, 700–712.
Lackner, J. R. (1974). Observations
on the speech processing capabili-
ties of an amnesic patient: several
aspects of H.M.’s language function.
Neuropsychologica 12, 199–207.
LaFrance, M. (1979). Nonverbal syn-
chrony and rapport: analysis by
the cross-lag panel technique. Soc.
Psychol. Q. 42, 66–70.
LaFrance, M., and Broadbent, M.
(1976). Group rapport: posture
sharing as a nonverbal indicator.
Group Org. Stud. 1, 328–333.
Landragin, F. (2006). Visual perception,
language and gesture: a model for
their understanding in multimodal
dialog systems. Signal Process. 86,
3578–3595.
Levelt, W. J. M. (1989). Speaking:
From Intention to Articulation.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Levelt, W. J. M., and Kelter, S. (1982).
Surface form and memory in
question answering. Cogn. Psychol.
14, 78–106.
Liberman, A. M., Cooper, F. S.,
Shankweiler, D. S., and Studdert-
Kennedy, M. (1967). Perception of
the speech code. Psychol. Rev. 74,
431–461.
Lin, S., Keysar, B., and Epley, N. (2010).
Reflexively mindblind: using the-
ory of mind to interpret behavior
requires effortful attention. J. Exp.
Soc. Psychol. 46, 551–556.
MacDonald, M. C., and Christiansen,
M. H. (2002). Reassessing work-
ing memory: comment on Just and
Carpenter (1992) and Waters and
Caplan (2002). Psychol. Rev. 109,
35–54.
MacKay, D. G., Burke, D. M., and
Stewart, R. (1998a). H.M.’s language
production deficits: implications for
relations between memory, seman-
tic binding, and the hippocam-
pal system. J. Mem. Lang. 38,
28–69.
MacKay, D. G., Stewart, R., and Burke,
D. M. (1998b). H.M. revisited: rela-
tions between language, compre-
hension, memory and the hip-
pocampal system. J. Cogn. Neurosci.
10, 377–394.
Manns, J., Hopkins, R., and Squire, L.
(2003). Semantic memory and the
human hippocampus. Neuron 38,
127–133.
Maurer, D., Pathman, T., and
Mondloch, C. J. (2006). The
shape of boubas: sound-shape
correspondences in toddlers and
adults. Dev. Sci. 9, 316–322.
Maybin, J., and Swann, J. (2007).
Everyday creativity in language: tex-
tuality, contextuality and critique.
Appl. Linguist. 28, 497–517.
Maye, J., Aslin, R. N., and Tanenhaus,
M. K. (2008). The weckud wetch
of the wast: lexical adaptation to a
novel accent. Cogn. Sci. 32, 543–562.
McCarthy, M. (1998). Spoken Language
and Applied Linguistics. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press.
McClelland, J. L., McNaughton, B. L.,
and O’Reilly, R. C. (1995). Why
there are complementary learning
systems in the hippocampus and
neocortex: insights from the suc-
cesses and failures of connection-
ist models of learning and memory.
Psychol. Rev. 102, 419–457.
Meyer, A. S. (2004). “The use of
eye tracking in studies of sentence
generation,” in The Integration of
Language, Vision, and Action: Eye
Movements and the Visual World,
eds F. Ferreira and J. Henderson
(New York, NY: Psychology Press),
191–211.
Meyer, A. S., Sleiderink, A., and Levelt,
W. J. M. (1998). Viewing and
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 69 | 10
Duff and Brown-Schmidt Hippocampus and language
naming objects: eye movements
during noun phrase production.
Cognition 66, B25–B33.
Milner, B., Corkin, S., and Teuber, H.
L. (1968). Further analysis of the
hippocampal amnesic syndrome: a
14-year follow up study of H.M.
Neuropsychologia 6, 215–234.
Nilsen, E. S., and Graham, S. A.
(2009). The relations between chil-
dren’s communicative perspective-
taking and executive functioning.
Cogn. Psychol. 58, 220–249.
Norrick, N. (1998). Retelling sto-
ries in spontaneous conversation.
Discourse Process. 25, 75–97.
Novick, J. M., Trueswell, J. C., and
Thompson-Schill, S. L. (2005).
Cognitive control and parsing:
Reexamining the role of Broca’s area
in sentence comprehension. Cogn.
Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 5, 263–281.
Nygaard, L. C., and Pisoni, D. B. (1998).
Talker-specific learning in speech
perception. Percept. Psychophys. 60,
355–376.
Ochs, E., and Capps, L. (2001).
Living Narrative: Creating Lives in
Everyday Storytelling. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
O’Kane, G., Kensinger, E., and Corkin,
S. (2004). Evidence for seman-
tic learning in profound amnesia:
an investigation with patient H.M.
Hippocampus 14, 417–425.
O’Keefe, J., and Nadel, L. (1978). The
Hippocampus as a Cognitive Map.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Olson, D. R. (1970). Language and
thought: Aspects of a cognitive the-
ory of semantics. Psychol. Rev. 77,
257–273.
Osgood, C. E. (1971). “Where do sen-
tences come from?” in Semantics:
an Inter-Disciplinary Reader
in Philosophy, Linguistics and
Psychology, eds D. D. Steinberg and
L. A. Jakobovits (Cambridge, MA:
Cambridge University Press).
Olson, I. R., Page, K., Sledge Moore,
K., Chatterjee, A., and Verfaellie,
M. (2006). Working memory for
conjunctions relies on the medial
temporal lobe. J. Neurosci. 26,
4596–4601.
Otten, M., and Van Berkum, J. J.
A. (2009). Does working memory
capacity affect the ability to predict
upcoming words in discourse? Brain
Res. 1291, 92–101.
Pardo, J. (2006). On phonetic conver-
gence during conversation. J. Acoust.
Soc. Am. 119, 2382–2393.
Peterson, G. E., and Barney, H. L.
(1952). Control methods used in a
study of the vowels. J. Acoust. Soc.
Am. 24, 175–184.
Pickering, M., and Garrod, S. (2004).
Toward a mechanistic psychology
of dialogue. Behav. Brain Sci. 27,
169–190.
Prior, P. (2001). Voices in text, mind
and society: sociohistoric accounts
of discourse acquisition and use.
J. Sec. Lang. Writ. 10, 55–81.
Ranganath, C. (2010). A unified
framework for the functional orga-
nization of the medial temporal
lobes and the phenomenology of
episodic memory. Hippocampus 20,
1263–1290.
Ranganath, C., and D’Esposito, M.
(2001). Medial temporal lobe activ-
ity associated with active mainte-
nance of novel information. Neuron
31, 865–873.
Reitter, D., and Moore, J. D. (2007).
“Predicting success in dialogue,”
in Proceedings of the 45th Annual
Meeting of the Association of
Computational Linguistics (ACL),
(Prague, Czech Republic), 808–815.
Reitter, D., Moore, J. D., and Keller,
F. (2006). “Priming of syntactic
rules in task-oriented dialogue
and spontaneous conversation,”
in Proceedings of the 28th Annual
Conference of the Cognitive Science
Society (CogSci), (Vancouver,
Canada), 685–690.
Richardson, D. C., and Dale, R. (2005).
Looking to understand: the coupling
between speakers’ and listeners’ eye
movements and its relationship to
discourse comprehension. Cogn. Sci.
29, 39–54.
Richardson, D. C., Dale, R., and
Kirkham, N. (2007). The art of
conversation is coordination: com-
mon ground and the coupling of
eye movements during dialogue.
Psychol. Sci. 18, 407–413.
Rubin, R., Brown-Schmidt, S., Duff,
M. C., Tranel, D., and Cohen, N.
J. (2011). How do I remember that
I know you know that I know?
Psychol. Sci. 22, 1574–1582.
Ryan, J. D., Althoff, R. R., Whitlow, S.,
and Cohen, N. J. (2000). Amnesia
is a deficit in relational memory.
Psychol. Sci. 11, 454–461.
Schmolck, H., Kensinger, E., Corkin,
S., and Squire, L. (2002). Semantic
knowledge in patient H.M. and
other patients with bilateral medial
and lateral temporal lobe lesions.
Hippocampus 12, 520–533.
Schmolck,H., Stefanacci, L., andSquire,
L. R. (2000). Detection and expla-
nation of ambiguity are unaffected
by hippocampal lesions but are
impaired by larger temporal lobe
lesions. Hippocampus 10, 759–770.
Schober, M. F. (1993). Spatial
perspective-taking in conversation.
Cognition 47, 1–24.
Schober, M. F., and Clark, H. H. (1989).
Understanding by addressees and
overhearers. Cogn. Psychol. 21,
211–232.
Scoville, W. B., and Milner, B. (1957).
Loss of recent memory after bilat-
eral hippocampal lesions. J. Neurol.
Neurosurg. Psychiatry 20, 11–12.
Sedivy, J. C., Tanenhaus, M. K.,
Chambers, C. G., and Carlson, G.
N. (1999). Achieving incremental
processing through contextual
representation: evidence from the
processing of adjectives. Cognition
71, 109–147.
Sharon, T.,Moscovitch, M., and Gilboa,
A. (2011). Rapid neocortical acqui-
sition of long-term arbitrary asso-
ciations independent of the hip-
pocampus. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U.S.A. 108, 1146–1151
Sherzer, J. (2002). Speech Play and
Verbal Art. Austin, TX: University of
Texas Press.
Spivey, M. J., Tanenhaus, M. K.,
Eberhard, K. M., and Sedivy, J.
C. (2002). Eye movements and
spoken language comprehension:
effects of visual context on syntactic
ambiguity resolution. Cogn. Psychol.
45, 447–481.
Squire, L. R. (1987).Memory and Brain.
New York, NY: Oxford University
Press.
Squire, L. R. (1992). Memory and
the hippocampus: a synthesis
from findings with rats, monkeys,
and humans. Psychol. Rev. 99,
195–231.
Tanenhaus, M. K., Spivey-Knowlton,
M. J., Eberhard, K. M., and Sedivy, J.
C. (1995). Integration of visual and
linguistic information in spoken
language comprehension. Science
268, 1632–1634.
Tannen, D. (1989). Talking Voices:




Tauroza, S., and Allison, D. (1990).
Speech rates in british english. Appl.
Linguist. 11, 90–105.
Tesink, C. M. J. Y., Petersson, K. M.,
Van Berkum, J. J. A., Van den Brink,
D., Buitelaar, J. K., and Hagoort,
P. (2009). Unification of speaker
and meaning in language compre-
hension: an fMRI study. J. Cogn.
Neurosci. 21, 2085–2099.
Trude, A. M., and Brown-Schmidt, S.
(2012). On-line accommodation of
regional accents. Lang. Cogn. Process
(in press)
Ullman, M. T. (2004). Contributions
of memory circuits to language:
the declarative/procedural model.
Cognition 92, 231–270.
Van Berkum, J. J. A. (in press). “The
electrophysiology of discourse and
conversation,” in The Cambridge
Handbook of Psycholinguistics, eds
M. Spivey, K. McRae, and M.
Joanisse (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press).
Van Berkum, J. J. A., Van den Brink,
D., Tesink, C. M. J. Y., Kos, M.,
and Hagoort, P. (2008). The neu-
ral integration of speaker and
message. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 20,
580–591.
Vargha-Khadem, F., Gadian, D. G.,
Watkins, K. E., Connely, A., Van
Paesschen, W., and Mishkin, M.
(1997). Differential effects of early
hippocampal pathology on episodic
and semantic memory. Science 277,
376–380.
Voloshinov, V. N. (1973). Marxism
and the Philosophy of Language.
Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
Wagner Cook, S., and Tanenhaus, M.
K. (2009). Embodied communica-
tion: speakers’ gestures affect listen-
ers’ actions. Cognition 113, 98–104.
Walker, M. A. (1996). Limited attention
and discourse structure. Comput.
Linguist. 22, 255–264.
Warren, D. E., Duff, M. C., Tranel, D.,
and Cohen, N. J. (2010). Medial
temporal lobe damage impairs
representation of simple stimuli.
Front. Hum. Neurosci. 4:35. Doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2010.00035
Wilkes-Gibbs, D., and Clark, H. H.
(1992). Coordinating beliefs in
conversation. J. Mem. Lang. 31,
183–194.
Wilson, M. P., and Garnsey, S. M.
(2009). Making simple sentences
hard: verb bias effects in simple
direct object sentences. J. Mem.
Lang. 60, 368–392.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research
was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships
that could be construed as a potential
conflict of interest.
Received: 24 October 2011; accepted: 13
March 2012; published online: 05 April
2012.
Citation: Duff MC and Brown-Schmidt
S (2012) The hippocampus and the flexi-
ble use and processing of language. Front.
Hum. Neurosci. 6:69. doi: 10.3389/
fnhum.2012.00069
Copyright © 2012 Duff and Brown-
Schmidt. This is an open-access arti-
cle distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution Non
Commercial License, which permits non-
commercial use, distribution, and repro-
duction in other forums, provided the
original authors and source are credited.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 69 | 11
